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DISABILITY, POVERTY, AND THE INCOME TAX: THE
CASE FOR REFUNDABLE CREDITS1
LISA PHILIPPS*
RIkSUM
Les politiques fiscales a 1' 6gard des personnes handicap~es ont 6t6 sensiblement am6lio-
r6es au cours des demi~res ann6es, mais elles n'ont pas aid6 les plus d6munis, qui n'ont
pas un revenu suffisant pour profiter des cr&lits et d6ductions 6tablis. L' article qui suit
plaide en faveur du cr6dit d'imp6t remboursable comme solution partielle a ce probl~me,
tout en faisant ressortir que les mesures fiscales doivent s'accompagner d'interventions
gouvernementales directes pour entrainer une v6dritable participation des personnes han-
dicap6es A la vie sociale et 6nonomique. On y examine le credit d'imp6t remboursable en
tant que soutien destin6 aux personnes handicap6es a faible revenu par opposition aux
cr6dits non remboursables existants et aux mesures non fiscales telles que les d6penses
de programmes directes. L'auteur explique ensuite comment les cr~dits d'imp6t rembour-
sables pourraient 6tre congus de fagon a 6viter les lacunes des d6penses fiscales sur le
plan de la politique g6n6rale et les obstacles constitutionnels que suppose un programme
de soutien pancanadien b l'intention des personnes handicap6es. Elle s'oppose A l'adop-
tion d'un programme de cr6dits subordonn6s au revenu comparable bL la Prestation
nationale pour enfants du gouvernement canadien ou au cridit d'imp6t pour personnes
handicap6es instaur6 par l'Angleterre. Son article fait plut6t l'61oge d'un cr6dit universel
accord6 a chaque personne handicap6e et remboursable en cas de faible revenu. Cette
mesure de soutien est le plus susceptible de nous permettre d' atteindre les objectifs fixes
en mati~re de lutte contre la pauvret6, en plus de rendre l'imp6t sur le revenu plus simple
et 6quitable. On suggire un moyen de concevoir un tel soutien de mani~re a tenir compte
des diff6rences de sexe, de race et de classe sociale, ainsi que des ides et de la comp6tence
memes des personnes vis6es.
Lisa Philipps is an associate professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, where she
teaches taxation law. After graduating from the University of Toronto Law School in 1986, she
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I. INTRODUCTION
The past several years have seen steady improvements in the tax treatment of people
with disabilities. Every federal budget since 1996 has in some way increased the
amount of tax recognition for the costs of living with or accommodating disabilities.
In the year 2000 the federal government made further promises to raise the Disability
Tax Credit by over 30% across the board, and by over 100% for children with
disabilities. 2 These advances can be credited to the work of advocacy groups and
researchers who have targeted the income tax system as a key instrument for improv-
ing disability supports, and also to the responsiveness of tax policy makers working
under the leadership of Finance Minister Paul Martin. Disability tax reform is far from
complete, however, and many gaps remain to be filled. The most glaring problem is
that existing tax measures are almost all "non-refundable," and therefore do not benefit
the lowest income members of the community.
For those with sufficient taxable income to absorb them, the disability-related deduc-
tions and credits in the Income Tax Act 3 can reduce an individual's tax payable, leaving
them with a higher after-tax income. For a person who is too poor to owe income tax,
however, these provisions are of no benefit. A non-refundable deduction or credit
cannot be received as a cash payment from government by individuals whose tax
liability is already nil. Given the high rates of poverty among people with disabilities,
this can only be seen as a gaping hole in the system of disability supports and a serious
inequity in the tax system.4
This problem has not gone unnoticed among commentators, and many have called on
governments to make disability-related tax measures refundable.5 Yet none has exam-
2. These increases were announced in the spring 2000 federal budget and the fall 2000 pre-election
"mini-budget": see Canada, Department of Finance, Budget 2000: The Budget Plan (February 28,
2000); and Id, Economic Statement and Budget Update (October 18, 2000). For detailed proposals
see Canada, Department of Finance, Legislative Proposals and Explanatory Notes Relating to
Income Tax (released December 21, 2000) [hereinafter Legislative Proposals], clause 62 (discussed
infra).
3. R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. 1, as am. [hereinafter ITA]. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory
references in this paper are to the ITA.
4. See G. Fawcett, Living with Disability in Canada: An Economic Portrait (Hull, QC: Office for
Disability Issues, Human Resources Development Canada, 1996), at 129-145. Fawcett's study is
based on the 1991 Statistics Canada Health and Activity Limitation Survey (HALS), the latest
available data. It indicates that 21.9% of people with disabilities aged 15 years and over had incomes
below Statistics Canada's Low Income Cut-offs, a widely accepted measure of poverty, compared to
12.6% of those without disabilities. This likely understates the poverty rate among people with
disabilities, because it is based on income figures before taking into account any extra disability-
related living costs and medical expenses. Further, the 1991 statistics indicate that the chances of
living in poverty are even greater than 21.9% if the person with a disability is a woman, is living
alone, is unemployed or not participating in the paid labour force, did not complete high school, lives
in an urban setting, has a moderate or severe (as opposed to mild) disability, or receives social
assistance. Note that the 2000 federal budget allocated funding for a new HALS to be carried out as
part of the 2001 national census: Canada, Department of Finance, Budget 2000: The Budget Plan
(February 28, 2000).
5. See, for example, D. Baker & H. Beatty, Consultant's Report on Taxation and Disability: Recom-
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ined in detail how such provisions might be designed and administered. In thii article
I take up this challenge. I begin in Part II by evaluating refundable tax credits as a
policy instrument for improving disability supports to low-income people. I compare
the non-refundable mechanisms used in the current Income TaxAct (ITA) to refundable
credits in terms of their technical operation and their distributive impact on taxpayers.
I then step back to consider whether a new disability support program is best delivered
through the tax system at all, or whether a direct transfer or some other instrument
would be preferable. I conclude that a refundable tax credit could play a highly
progressive role in delivering disability supports, provided that it is designed
creatively to mitigate some of the drawbacks of tax based programs. I also caution
against over-reliance on refundable tax credits alone to assist those with low
incomes. Individualized cash benefits must be coordinated with direct investments
in the supply of needed goods and services, and with regulatory measures to promote
the full participation of people with disabilities in all aspects of social, political, and
economic life.
Part III considers in more detail how best to design and administer refundable tax
credits for people with disabilities. I first discuss some key policy choices that will
affect the design of such a program, such as what needs it is meant to address and
whom exactly it is meant to assist. I explain why, in designing a refundable credit,
policy makers will need to attend carefully to differences of class, gender, and race
among people with disabilities. Part III then turns to examine three possible models
for reform, placed on a continuum from more incremental to more innovative
approaches:
1. Rework existing refundable credits to take better account of disability-related
needs
2. Add refundability to existing disability-related deductions and credits
3. Create a new refundable tax credit that would improve upon and replace some
of the existing disability-related provisions
I evaluate each of these models against objectives of reducing poverty, enhancing
autonomy, providing access to disability-related goods and services, and integrating
people with disabilities more fully into all aspects of society. I also consider how well
mended Reforms (Ottawa, Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, 1996), at 8-11; J. Berman,
"Commissioners' Personal Comments" in Fair Taxation in a Changing World Report of the Ontario
Fair Tax Commission (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1993), at 987-92; D. Duff, "Disability
and the Income Tax" (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 797, at 883-89; Federal Task Force on Disability Issues,
"Costs of Disability" in Equal Citizenship for Canadians with Disabilities: The Will to Act (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer for Canada, 1996); R. Shillington, Taxation and Disability: A Report for the Federal
Task Force on Disability Issues (Ottawa: Canadian Council for Social Development, 1996), at 17-19;
Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Disabled Persons, As True as Taxes:
Disability and the Income Tax System (Ottawa: The Committee, 1993) at 13-14; and C.F.L. Young,
Women, Tax and Social Programs: The Gendered Impact of Funding Social Programs through the
Tax System (Ottawa: Status of Women, 2000) at 60,61.
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each model coheres with traditional tax policy criteria, especially the principles of
equity and simplicity.
Concluding that the third model--creating an entirely new refundable credit-is by
far the most attractive, I go on to discuss some of the specific design issues it would
raise, particularly the choice between universal versus income-tested benefits.
Canada's National Child Benefit and Britain's Disabled Person's Tax Credit are
reviewed as examples of income tested refundable credits. I argue that a universal
refundable credit, available to all people with disabilities, regardless of income, is a
far better option. I suggest how such a credit could be designed with some redistribu-
tive features that would channel a larger share of resources to those with lower
incomes.
II. WHY REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS? CHOOSING A POLICY
INSTRUMENT FOR IMPROVING DISABILITY SUPPORTS
A. Tax Mechanisms: What's so Special about Refundable Credits?
This section compares four distinct mechanisms used by the ITA to provide tax relief
to individuals with disabilities and to others who support, care for, or employ them:
(1) income exclusions; (2) deductions; (3) non-refundable credits; and (4) refundable
credits. I provide examples of each mechanism, explaining how it affects the calcula-
tion of tax liability, and why it has such different effects on the distribution of the tax
burden among people with higher and lowerincomes. My analysis demonstrates why
refundable credits are the only reliable means of delivering tax relief to those with
very little or no taxable income. A more difficult question, however, is whether the
tax system is the right vehicle for delivering such benefits at all, as compared to a
direct spending program or some other policy instrument. I reserve these larger issues
for the next section of the paper.
The most basic distinction among the four tax mechanisms I will discuss is that each
operates at a different stage in the calculation of tax liability, as illustrated by Table l on
the next page.
Taking each of the four mechanisms in turn, I provide examples of how they are used
currently to grant tax relief in relation to disability, and compare their distributive
impact on taxpayers in different income groups.
1. Exclusions from Income
The first way in which the ITA provides tax relief to people with disabilities is to
exclude certain payments or amounts from the definition of taxable income. It is
important, however, that these exclusions are based not on the status of the taxpayer
as disabled or poor, but on the type of income received. As a consequence, income
exclusions are, distributively speaking, a rather arbitrary form of assistance. If a
low-income person does not receive income from the "right" sources, all of her income
will be subject to tax.
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Table 1: Steps in the Calculation of Federal Income Tax Liability
6
gross income
minus deductions
= "income"
7
minus further deductions
= "taxable income"
taxable income x progressive
marginal tax rates8
= preliminary tax payable
(before credits)
minus non-refundable credits9
= federal tax payable
LI
mechanism 1: exclusions
mechanism 2: deductions
mechanism 2: more deductions
mechanism 3: non-refundable credits
minus refundable credits mechanism 4: refundable credits
= federal tax owing or refund owing to taxpayer
(a negative balance or 'overpayment' due to refundable credits is paid to taxpayer)
6. Note that after computing federal income tax, provincial income-tax liability is computed, and the
two are added together to reach the taxpayer's final tax bill. Each province maintains its own
separate income tax legislation, but all provinces except for Quebec have largely incorporated the
federal system under a set of administrative arrangements known as the Tax Collection Agreements.
The interaction of federal and provincial tax mechanisms is discussed further in Part II.B., infra.
7. The term income refers to a taxpayer's net income after deducting certain expenses and other
amounts allowed under Division B, Part I of the ITA: s. 3. Income is then adjusted to reach taxable
income under Division C, which allows a second layer of deductions: s. 2(2). Thus a taxpayer may
be entitled to claim deductions at two different stages in the calculation of tax liability.
8. For the 2001 taxation year, the marginal rates are 16% on the first $30,754 of taxable income; 22%
on taxable income over $30,754, up to $61,509; 26% on taxable income over $61,509, up to
$100,000; 29% on any taxable income over $100,000: see Legislative Proposals, supra note 2, cl.
58(2), amending s. 117(2).
9. The most important non-refundable tax credit is the basic personal credit in 2001, which effectively
exempts from tax the first $7,412 earned by all taxpayers: s. 118(l)(c). This "basic personal amount"
is scheduled to rise to at least $8,000 by 2004: see Legislative Proposals, idL, cl. 59(3.1).
(2001) 16 Journal of Law and Social Policy
People with disabilities receive income from a wide range of sources.10 Though it is
useful to categorize them loosely as public or private, it should be remembered that
many "private" income plans are in fact publicly subsidized through tax incentives or
otherwise, while "public" support is sometimes conditioned upon prior participation
in the labour force and payment of contributions or premiums. Private sources of
income would include, for example, employment or self-employment, investments in
corporate shares, bonds, or other income-producing properties, pensions and other
retirement savings, private disability-insurance plans, and court-awarded damages or
settlements in personal injury actions; Public sources of income for people with
disabilities include provincial automobile accident insurance, worker's compensation
and social assistance schemes, and federally the Old Age Security (OAS), Canada
Pension Plan (CPP), Quebec Pension Plan (QPP), and Employment Insurance (EI)
programs.
Payments from some of these sources are excluded from the ITA's definition of
income, either by legislative exemption or by judicial or administrative interpretation,
while others must be included in income and fully or partially subjected to tax.11 Thus
the tax status of income received by people with disabilities depends very heavily on
its source, and sometimes upon fine distinctions about the exact circumstances in
which it was received. This is well illustrated, for example, by the tax treatment of
payments under a disability insurance plan arranged through an employer. When an
employee becomes disabled and makes a claim under such a plan, the insurance
payments may be taxable or non-taxable, depending on who paid the premiums under
the plan. If the premiums were paid exclusively by the employee, the insurance
benefits are tax free. If an employer or other person (such as a union) paid all or any
portion of the premiums, however, the employee must report payments under the plan
as income. Where the cost of premiums was shared, the employee may deduct her
portion and report only the net benefit for income tax purposes.12 Further complica-
tions can arise if the insurance company disputes an employee's eligibility for benefits,
and eventually settles the claim with a lump-sum payment. In two recent cases, the
Tax Court of Canada held that such lump-sum payments are not caught by the ITA and
can be received tax free, regardless of who paid the premiums under the plan. 13
However, the same Court held in another case that the lump sum settlement was taxable
because, inter alia, the employer had paid the premiums under the plan. 14 Finally, if
an employee has no disability insurance benefits but instead receives sick pay or
10. See Fawcett, supra note 4 at 140-46.
11. See Duff, supra note 5, at 874-81; David Schulze, "Obstacles to Equity: An Analysis of the Taxation
of Disability Income in Canada and Proposals for Reform" 14 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 135; and
David M. Sherman, Taxes, Health & Disabilities (Scarborough: Carswell Thomson Professional
Publishing, 1995) at 139-53.
12. See s. 6(1)(f), and Interpretation Bulletin IT 428, Wage Loss Replacement Plans (April 30, 1979).
13. Whitehouse v. R., 2000 D.T.C. 1616 (T.C.C.) (informal procedure); Landry v. R., 98 D.T.C. 1416
(T.C.C.) (informal procedure).
14. Dumas v. R., 2000 D.T.C. 2603 (T.C.C.) (general procedure).
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compassionate payments directly from an employer, these amounts are fully taxable
in the same manner as regular wages. 15
The tax treatment of public income support also varies, depending on the program.
Sickness or disability benefits received under the CPP, QPP, EI, or OAS must all be
included in income. 16 By contrast, social assistance and worker's compensation are
not subject to income tax, though they are included in determining eligibility for
certain income tested tax credits. 17 Thus receipt of welfare or worker's compensation
may result in the loss of other tax-based benefits such as the age credit for those over
65,18 the goods and services tax credit, 19 the Canada child tax benefit, 20 and the
refundable medical expense supplement. 21 Payments under a provincial auto accident
insurance plan are not required to be included in income at all.2 2
Income exclusions may be helpful to some low-income people with disabilities who
happen to receive their incomes from non-taxable sources. But overall they are highly
inefficient and unfair as a mechanism for tackling poverty among people with disabil-
ities. First, the income exclusions are of no value to those earning less than the basic
personal amount, which is received tax free in any event by all individuals ($7,412 in
2001, scheduled to rise to $8,000 by 2004).23 Nor do they assist those who live on
poverty-level incomes from fully taxable sources, such as wages, CPP, EL, OAS, or
employer-paid disability insurance. The system could be made more horizontally
equitable by treating all forms of disability income the same, instead of exempting
some and taxing others.24 But exempting all disability income from tax would be
vertically inequitable as between lower and higher income individuals. This is because
the value of an income exclusion in terms of tax dollars saved rises directly in
proportion to income. A single person with a disability, living modestly on $10,000 of
15. S. 5(1), 6(l)(a). There is a narrow exception that allows employees with disabilities to receive certain
cash or in-kind benefits from their employers tax-free. If an employee meets the stringent definition
of disability needed to qualify for the disability tax credit (discussed infra at note 40 and related
text), two types of fringe benefits are expressly excluded from income: the cost of hiring an attendant
to assist the employee in the performance of her duties, or, where the employee has a mobility
impairment, the cost of transportation to and from work and parking near the workplace: s. 6(16).
16. Ss. 56(l)(a)(i)(A),(B),(iv).
17. This is accomplished by including such benefits in the definition of income (s. 56(1)(u),(v)), but then
deducting them from "taxable income" (s. 110(l)(f) preamble, (ii)). Note 7 explained the difference
between income and taxable income.
18. S. 118(2).
19. S. 122.5.
20. S. 122.61.
21. S. 122.51.
22. Duff, supra note 5, citing a private opinion letter from Revenue Canada.
23. Supra note 9.
24. For an argument in favour of full taxation of all disability income, with full deductibility of all
contributions to income-replacement plans, see Duff, supra note 5, at 879-81. Schulze makes the
opposite case, calling for a comprehensive exemption for all forms of disability income and full
taxation of amounts contributed to income-replacement programs (supra note 11, at 150-60).
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non-taxable social assistance per year,25 for example, receives far less support through
the tax system than someone who lives much more comfortably on $50,000 of
non-taxable disability insurance payments. The person with $50,000 not only enjoys
a tax exemption on more dollars but avoids tax at higher rates on a portion of her
income. And as noted above, the lowest income group comprising those earning less
than the basic personal amount of $7,412 receives no benefit at all from income
exclusions. No matter how comprehensive or well designed, in other words, income
exclusions are a wholly ineffective and inequitable way of delivering tax-based
support to low-income people with disabilities.
2. Deductions
Deductions are the second mechanism by which the income tax system recognizes the
costs of living with or accommodating disabilities. The ITA allows certain disability-
related expenses to be deducted when computing a taxpayer's income if the expenses
are linked directly to an income-producing activity or (in some cases) to educational
activities. For example, the cost of attendant care can be deducted if it enables a
taxpayer to engage in employment, business, grant-funded research, or certain educa-
tion programs, up to a limit of two-thirds of the taxpayer's earned income.26 Likewise,
the 2000 federal budget created an enhanced child-care expense deduction for parents
who engage in these same activities if they have a child with a disability.27 Finally,
business owners who make buildings more accessible for mobility-impaired individ-
uals or who purchase certain disability-related equipment can deduct 100% of such
expenses in the year they are incurred. 28 Normally, capital expenditures of this nature
must be deducted more gradually over a number of taxation years under the capital
cost allowance rules in the ITA. 29
These deductions can be justified in tax policy terms on the basis that they recognize
costs of earning income. The presence of disabilities often increases the cost of
engaging in income-producing activities. Since a taxpayer has not augmented her
personal income until such overhead expenses are recovered, they must be deducted
25. Standard rates of social assistance for single people with disabilities are below $10,000 in all jurisdictions
in Canada except Ontario, Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut, and in all jurisdictions are
well below Statistics Canada's low-income cutoff: National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes
1999 (Ottawa, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2000), tables 2 and 3.
26. An individual must qualify for the disability tax credit in order to claim this deduction, and must not
claim the cost of the attendant care as a medical expense for purposes of the medical-expenses tax
credit: s. 64, as proposed to be amended by Legislative Proposals, supra note 2, cl. 26. For those
enrolled in educational programs, the maximum claim is effectively limited to $10,000 per year.
27. S. 63, as proposed to be amended by Legislative Proposals, supra note 2, cl. 25. Such parents can
deduct up to $10,000 for child care expenses each year, compared to the maximum of $7,000 for a
non-disabled child under seven years of age and $4,000 for a non-disabled child over age six. The
claim is also limited to two-thirds of the taxpayer's "earned income" per year, and where there are
two parents or other supporting persons, the one with the lower income generally must claim the
deduction.
28. S. 20(l)(qq),(rr), 18(3.1). The specific improvements and items of equipment covered by these
deductions are prescribed by s. 8800 and s. 8801 of the Regulations under the ITA.
29. S. 18(l)(b), 20(1)(a); Regulations Part XI, Schedules IT-VI.
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simply to achieve a realistic measurement of ability to pay. Alternatively, they can be
justified in social policy terms as measures designed to promote access to education,
jobs, and commercial establishments for adults with disabilities and parents of disabled
children. Certainly the accelerated deduction for disability-related improvements and
equipment is more generous than the normal method of recognizing capital expenses,
suggesting strongly that there is a social-policy objective at play beyond the strict
requirements of tax policy.
Whatever the justification, however, it is clear that people with little or no taxable
income receive minimal if any benefits from these deductions. Obviously, no deduc-
tion is available to those who cannot afford to purchase these items in the first place.
A tax deduction at the end of the year provides no cash in hand to help finance the
purchase of disability-related goods and services. Where a person does manage to
purchase items needed to work or attend school, the deductions may still be of no value
if her income is low. For example, someone starting her own small business could
claim nothing for attendant care or for care of a child with a disability, if the business
loses money or just breaks, even initially. Because deductions for these costs are
limited to two-thirds of the income earned in a year, they are simply lost to the extent
that income is too low to absorb them.30 Likewise, a small-business owner would
obtain no immediate recognition for the costs of making the premises physically
accessible if profits were insufficient that year to absorb the cost of renovations,
though in this case the expense could be carried over and deducted in another year, if
and when profits become available. 31 A similar problem would arise for a low-wage
or part-time employee who earns $9,000 per year. If the employee could afford to
purchase attendant care or child-care services at all, the costs could in principle be
deducted up to a maximum of $6,000 (two-thirds of $9,000). However, after taking
into account the basic personal credit, which shelters the first $7,412 of earnings from
tax in any event, the deductions could at best remove tax liability from the remaining
$1,588 of the taxpayer's income. The potential value of the deductions is eroded due
to lack of sufficient employment income. The first problem is that deductions will be
partially or entirely lost to those whose market activities produce low returns. A further
problem is that the value of a deduction rises with the claimant's tax rate. A $1,000
deduction is worth $200 in tax savings to a taxpayer with a marginal rate of 20%, for
example, but is worth $500 to a higher-income person with a 50% marginal rate. Like
income exclusions, deductions raise a number of vertical equity problems.
30. Attendant care might be deductible beyond this limit, if it can be characterized as a regular expense
of carrying on business, similar to hiring an administrative or other business assistant (see Sherman,
supra note 11, at 161). However, such a claim may be challenged if the employee is thought to be
attending to the taxpayer's personal needs rather than to business-related needs. In Symes v. R.,
[1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to allow the taxpayer to deduct her
child-care expenses as a general business expense, holding that she was limited to the maximum
amount specified in s. 63.
31. Business losses due to expenses deducted under ss. 20(l)(qq) or (rr) are classified as "non-capital"
losses and can be carried forward to reduce taxable income in any of the next seven taxation years, or
back to any of the previous three taxation years: ss. 11 l(l)(a),(8). Alternatively, such expenses could
be capitalized and deducted over time as capital cost allowance, as profits became available.
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One response to these complaints is that the deductions simply recognize overhead
costs to ensure that a person's taxable income reflects her real ability to pay. Using
this reasoning, denying such expenses to those with no earnings does not violate
principles of tax equity, since these individuals will have no income that is subject to
tax in any event. Likewise, from this perspective, the fact that deductions technically
are worth the most to taxpayers in the highest rate bracket is not a distributive problem,
because the amount deducted is not really available as disposable income but is
consumed by work-related expenses. This conventional tax-policy logic is unsatisfy-
ing in the present context, however, because the purposes of disability-related deduc-
tions go beyond the narrow objective of measuring income accurately. They were
clearly also designed to advance broader objectives of social and economic policy of
improving access to education and job markets for a specific group: people with
disabilities. However, the lowest-income members of the disabled community, for
whom these access needs are perhaps most urgent, are excluded from the provisions.
As a means of supporting the participation and independence of low-income people
with disabilities, tax deductions are a grossly ineffective and inequitable policy
instrument.
3. Non-refundable Credits
Non-refundable credits are by far the most important mechanism by which the ITA
recognizes the costs of disability. As illustrated above in table 1, credits come into
play later than deductions in the calculation of tax liability. Whereas deductions reduce
the base of taxable income that is subject to tax under the marginal rate scheme, credits
are subtracted after the marginal rates have been applied, as a direct reduction of tax
payable. The basic personal credit and many of the other personal credits in the current
ITA used to be offered as deductions. They were converted to non-refundable credits
in 1988 in order to equalize their value to taxpayers in higher and lower tax brackets.
As has been discussed, the value of a deduction rises with an individual's tax rate. A
credit, however, reduces tax payable by the same dollar amount for all, or more
precisely for all those who have tax liability against which to claim it. A credit of
$1,000, for instance, represents a $1,000 tax saving, regardless of the taxpayer's
marginal rate, provided she has at least $1,000 of taxes owing after the marginal rates
are applied to her taxable income. Unlike income exclusions or deductions, then, the
value of non-refundable credits does not rise with a person's income. However, the
lack of refundability means that those with the very lowest incomes are wholly or
partially excluded from such credits. People with incomes at or below the basic
personal amount may qualify technically for a disability-related non-refundable credit,
but it will provide no additional tax saving to them. As we shall see, to enjoy the full
benefits of the non-refundable credits, a person with a disability must earn well over
the basic personal amount of $7,412.
Two measures-the disability tax credit32 (DTC) and the medical expenses tax credit33
(METC)-are the principal means of providing tax relief to people with disabilities
32. S. 118.3.
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and their families. 34 In addition, family members of people with disabilities may be
eligible to claim the non-refundable caregiver credit35 or infirm dependent credit. 36
Each of these four credits has been substantially enriched in recent years. However,
the following discussion explains why the enrichments have provided little benefit to
low-income taxpayers. 37
The DTC reduces federal tax payable in 2001 by a flat dollar amount of $960, plus a
supplement of $560 where the person with a disability is under age 18.38 More
precisely, the credit is calculated as a dollar amount of $6,000 (plus $3,500 for the
supplement), multiplied by the lowest marginal tax rate of 16%. 39 The lowest marginal
rate was adopted as the credit rate for almost all personal credits when they were
converted from deductions in 1988, effectively reducing their value for those in higher
tax brackets. Another way to understand the DTC is that it eliminates tax liability from
$6,000 of taxable income (up to $9,500 in the case of a child) over and above the basic
personal amount. This means that in 2001 adults with taxable incomes of less than
$13,412 ($6,000 + $7,412) will be unable to claim the full amount of the DTC. These
individuals will receive only partial benefit, or in some cases (those with less than
$7,412 of taxable income), no benefit from the DTC. In order to qualify for the DTC,
a taxpayer must be certified by (usually) a medical doctor as having a "severe and
prolonged mental or physical impairment" such that "the individual's ability to
perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted," or would be markedly
restricted but for certain therapies (such as kidney dialysis) needed to sustain vital
functions. 40 A person who meets this definition is entitled to claim the DTC, regardless
of her income level or whether she incurred any specific out-of-pocket costs for
medications, equipment, or other goods or services related to her disability. The DTC
is not designed to compensate for these specific expenses, many of which are covered
by the METC. Rather, it recognizes the less easily accounted for daily costs of living
33. S. 118.2.
34. The revenue foregone by virtue of the DTC and METC is projected to be about $310 million and
$430 million, respectively, in 2001. The next most significant measure is the caregiver credit
(1 18(1)(c. 1)), at a projected cost of $70 million in 2001: Canada, Department of Finance, Govern-
ment of Canada Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2000 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2000).
35. S. 118(1)(c.1).
36. S. 118(l)(d).
37. For a detailed history, description, and policy evaluation of the non-refundable credits, see Duff,
supra note 5; and Gena Katz, 'Tax Assistance for the Disabled" 47 Can. Tax J. 663.
38. s.118.3(1), as proposed to be amended by Legislative Proposals, supra note 2, cl. 62(5). Note that
the supplement for children with disabilities may be reduced or eliminated if certain deductions or
credits are claimed in respect of caregiving services for the child.
39. See the definition of appropriate percentage in s. 248(1).
40. S. 118.3(1)(a. 1), as proposed to be amended by Legislative Proposals, supra note 2, cl. 62(2)-(4).
See also the explanatory notes at 406 of the Legislative Proposals. An impairment is defined to be
"prolonged" where it lasts for a continuous period of at least 12 months (s. 118.4(l)(a)). Basic
activities of daily living are defined in terms of vital physical and mental functions such as feeding
and dressing oneself, speaking, hearing, walking, etc, and are expressly stated not to include work-
ing, housekeeping, or recreational activities (s. 118.4(1)(c),(d)).
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with a disability, such as the loss of income-earning opportunities, having more limited
choices about where one can shop or do business, or needing more personal services
such as food delivery and taxi rides. 41
The METC, by contrast, can be claimed only for specific, receipted "medical expenses"
as defined by the ITA. 42 The METC applies to expenses over and above an annual
threshold equal to 3% of the claimant's income, or a dollar figure of $1,678 for 2001,
whichever is less.43 Some of the expenses covered by the METC are not in any way
limited to people with disabilities, such as the cost of eyeglasses, dental work, lab
tests, or prescription drugs. However, many others are frequently disability related,
such as the cost of wheelchairs, wheelchair vans, and artificial limbs. Some cannot be
claimed unless an individual qualifies for the DTC or meets another definition of
impairment or incapacity, including, for example, the cost of attendant or nursing
home care, guide dogs, home renovations, caregiver training, medically prescribed
therapies, and educational tutoring.
Low-income people receive limited benefits from the METC because it is non-refund-
able, but also because they have relatively little money to spend on the goods and
services covered by the METC. In addition, the requirement that low-income individ-
uals spend over 3% of their income on qualifying medical expenses each year before
they can begin claiming the METC further limits their access to the credit. Indeed,
this aspect of the METC is starkly regressive, because taxpayers earning over about
$56,000 can use the dollar threshold of $1,678, which is less than 3% of their income.
It must be noted that some of the problems of non-refundability have been alleviated
by making the DTC and the METC transferable to other family members. A person
who pays the medical expenses of a disabled spouse or dependent relative is entitled
to claim the METC. 44 And where a person who qualifies for the DTC has insufficient
tax liability to use it up, any excess credit can be transferred to a spouse,45 or on certain
conditions to a parent, child or other relative with whom the individual resides or on
whom she is dependent for support.46 The transferability of these credits reduces the
costs of non-refundability to some degree by allowing a low-income person to access
the credits indirectly if she has a family member with enough tax liability to absorb
them. However, transferability has serious limitations. It is of no value to those who
have no spouse and who are not supported by relatives. Notably, people with disabil-
ities are more likely not to have a spouse and to live alone than people without
disabilities.47 And living alone greatly increases their chance of being poor: 39.7% of
men and 48.2% of women with disabilities who lived alone in 1991 had incomes below
41. See Duff, supra note 5 at 834-36; and Katz, supra note 37 at 666.
42. The detailed list of items that qualify as "medical expenses" is contained in s. 118.2(2).
43. S. 118.2(1).
44. Ss. 118.2(2)(a), 118(6).
45. S. 118.8.
46. S. 18.3(2), as proposed to be amended by Legislative Proposals, supra note 2, cl. 62(6).
47. Fawcett, supra note 4 at 40, and 163-165.
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the poverty line, compared to 16.5% of those who lived in households with other
people.48 Even where a spouse or supporting relative is present, the transferability of
non-refundable credits will be of no value if she has a low income, and therefore
insufficient tax liability to absorb unused DTC or METC amounts. Thus transferability
fails to alleviate the problems of non-refundability for many of the most economically
disadvantaged people with disabilities.
Transferring unused credits is not an ideal approach, even for those who can take full
advantage of this mechanism. As Young points out, the transfer of credits "gives the
tax subsidy to the economically dominant person in the relationship. This increases
the economic dependence of individuals with a disability on the spouse [or other
relative, I would add] and deprives them of what could be a small source of income." 49
In this regard, tax statistics show that in 1997, the latest year for which data is available,
men reported more than four times the amount of personal credits transferred from a
spouse than women.50 Though this figure includes not only the disability-related
credits but also a number of other personal credits, it illustrates how transferability
may simply reproduce a gendered pattern of financial dependence within families.
Income-tax law has a long history of reinforcing women's economic subordination by
assuming that women's needs will be met privately by a male breadwinner, and that
tax benefits provided to a man will automatically be shared with a female partner.51
Instead of transferring the DTC and METC away, making them refundable directly to
their intended beneficiaries would be a far better way of recognizing disability-related
costs and promoting the autonomy of individuals with disabilities, especially women
with disabilities, regardless of their family circumstances and income level.
The infirm dependants credit and the caregiver credit are smaller credits that are
targeted at certain family members of people with disabilities. Either can reduce
federal taxes by up to $560.52 In order to claim the infirm dependants credit, an adult
must be dependent on the taxpayer due to a mental or physical infirmity. The caregiver
credit was first announced in 1998 and is available to taxpayers who reside with an
adult relative who is elderly or has a mental or physical infirmity. There is no
requirement for the elderly or infirm relative to be financially dependent upon the
taxpayer, but the credit is lost if the relative has income over $15,453. The federal
government presented the caregiver credit as a step towards fulfilling its promises to
value women's unpaid work.53 However, it has not been carefully designed to achieve
this objective. Any member of the household is allowed to claim the credit whether or
48. Id., at 134-35.
49. Supra note 5 at 61. See also Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Fair Taxation in a Changing World:
Report of the Ontario Fair Tax Commission (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1993) at 312, 316.
50. This figure is derived from Income Statistics - 1999 Edition (1997 tax year) (Ottawa: Canada
Customs and Revenue Agency, 2000), Basic Table 4.
51. See L. Philipps, "Tax Law and Social Reproduction: The Gender of Fiscal Policy in an Age of
Privatization" (forthcoming).
52. S. 1 18(1)(c. 1),(d), as proposed to be amended by Legislative Proposals, supra note 2, cl. 59.
53. See House of Commons Debates, 1 st Sess., 36th Parl., No. 189: 12424 (4 March 1999) (Hedy Fry).
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not she actually provided any care to the relative. In fact, the provision makes no
reference to caregiving at all, requiring only that the relative is co-resident. Because
it is non-refundable, a primary caregiver who has little or no income of her own will
receive no direct benefit from the credit. Instead, the drafters made the standard
assumption that there will also be a household breadwinner who will claim the credit
and somehow use it to help "look after" a stay-at-home caregiver. Despite its billing,
the credit is not well crafted to recognize the work of unpaid caregivers, because it
gives them no direct access to any income unless they also work for pay and earn
enough to claim the credit. Households in which all members have little or no taxable
income will gain nothing from either the infirm dependants credit or the caregiver
credit. For example, a single woman who loses her paid job and goes on social
assistance while she cares for a partner or other relative with a disability would have
no access to either of these non-refundable credits. 54
4. Refundable Credits
Refundable credits are applied at the final stage of computing tax liability. They are
the only relieving mechanism that can result in a payment from government to the
taxpayer. Technically this is accomplished by finding the individual to have made a
fictional payment on account of tax, which she is then entitled to have refunded. In
reality, refundable credits should be viewed as transfer payments from government,
which are delivered through the income tax system.
There is only one refundable credit in the ITA of special relevance to people with
disabilities: the refundable medical expense supplement, which pays up to $520 to
individuals who earn modest amounts of income from employment or self-employ-
ment and who have at least $2,000 of medical expenses that qualify for the METC. 55
This supplement to the METC was introduced in 1997 as a means of partially offsetting
the loss of provincial social assistance benefits by those entering paid work.56 It is
targeted exclusively at lower-income individuals, phasing out gradually once a tax-
payer's income exceeds $19,705. For those on social assistance it does not enhance
after-tax income but merely lessens the impact of losing welfare benefits.
Some low-income people with disabilities or their family members may be eligible
for the Canada child tax benefit or the goods and services tax credit, both of which
are income-tested refundable credits paid in regular instalments through the taxation
year. However, these are not targeted in any specific way at people with disabilities,
nor do they recognize extra costs associated with a disability.
5. Conclusion
This discussion has shown why refundable credits are the only mechanism by which
tax measures for people with disabilities can be fully extended to reach low-income
people. In particular, refundable credits would assist two groups of people who cannot
54. See Philipps, supra note 51 at 94-95; and Young, supra note 5, at 60.
55. S. 122.51.
56. See Duff, supra note 5 at 865-69.
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benefit directly from income exclusions, deductions, or non-refundable credits. The
first group comprises those who live in households in which no one's income exceeds
the basic personal amount. For example, single people or couples living on social
assistance or CPP disability payments, or on low wages, simply have no income or
tax liability against which to claim non-refundable tax benefits. The second group
comprises those who are financially supported by a partner or other person who claims
tax relief for a disability. This group includes, for example, a woman with a disability
who has no taxable income but whose partner earns a $50,000 salary. It would also
include a non-disabled woman who remains out of paid work in order to care for a
spouse or parent with a disability who receives taxable disability income of $50,000
per annum. This second group may benefit indirectly from existing deductions and
credits if they can be claimed by the income-earning member of the household.
However, they have no direct access to current tax benefits and have no legal right to
share in the tax savings realized by the income earner.
A refundable credit therefore has significant appeal as way to correct inequities in the
tax system as well as reduce poverty and increase autonomy among people whose lives
are affected by disabilities, directly or as supportive family members. Because they
put new cash in hand, refundable credits could help some low-income people to
finance the purchase of previously unaffordable equipment or services that facilitate
independent living, enable participation in paid work, or otherwise improve the quality
of life. Finally, if a refundable credit was designed to be paid in advance at regular
intervals throughout the year, it could ease the cash-flow problems associated with tax
deductions or credits that can be claimed only after the end of a taxation year. While
they are clearly superior to other tax mechanisms, however, a more challenging
question is why we should choose the tax system in the first place as the vehicle for
deploying new public resources for people with disabilities. The next section of the
paper compares refundable credits to other possible policy instruments outside the tax
system.
B. Why the Tax System?
A policy decision to increase support to low-income people with disabilities need not
be implemented through the tax system at all. The most obvious alternative would be
a direct payment through the social assistance system or some other transfer program.
Or the resources could be used instead by governments to provide disability-related
goods and services such as more accessible public infrastructure, housing stocks, or
personal services to support domestic, educational, or income earning-activities. Yet
another approach would be to invest more heavily in regulatory systems or subsidies
to induce employers, commercial vendors, and other public and private actors to
accommodate people with disabilities. A full comparative evaluation of these different
policy instruments is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in this section I review
the main attractions as well as the drawbacks of tax-based programming relative to its
alternatives. Dealing first with issues of policy effectiveness, I highlight concerns
about the technical complexity of tax law, the slowness and rigidity of its annual
assessment cycle, and the limited sensitivity of tax administration to the objectives of
disability support. I also discuss problems of intergovernmental coordination that
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would arise because of the constitutional division of powers over taxation versus social
programs. None of these difficulties is insurmountable. However, they do suggest the
need for careful and creative work by policy makers in pursuing a refundable tax credit
for people with disabilities. I return to these points in part III, in the discussion of
design options for a refundable credit.
1. Policy Effectiveness of Tax Benefits versus Direct Expenditures
The tax system has some attractions as a vehicle for achieving public policy objectives,
as well as some clear limitations. One of the principle attractions is the relatively low
cost of administering tax-based programs, from the perspective of both government
and individual recipients, because claims can be processed through the existing filing
requirements and bureaucratic machinery of the tax system.57 The Canada Child Tax
Benefit, for instance, is delivered purely on the basis of income figures reported in the
annual tax return. The only additional information needed is the income of a spouse.
For those low-income people who would not otherwise file a tax return, of course,
even this requirement imposes an administrative burden.58 By comparison, however,
provincial social assistance schemes are far more complex and burdensome, requiring
extensive and ongoing documentation of all sources of potential and deemed income,
including gifts and payments on any debt owing to the applicant, as well as assets.59
Politically, tax-based programs are often more viable than direct spending initiatives
because they are widely, if wrongly, perceived to involve less government interference
in the economy. The federal government regularly publicizes the estimated cost of
deductions and credits in its budget documents and tax expenditure reports,60 but
decisions to forego revenue are nonetheless still seen as somehow less costly and less
activist than direct expenditures. Tax-based measures may be especially convenient
in a period of heightened fiscal restraint and skepticism about the state's proper role
in the market. At least in the short term, the fiscal-political environment likely favours
any program that can be framed as a tax cut.
Beyond these general attributes there are several reasons that tax measures may be
particularly appropriate in the context of disability support. First, it is important to
note that the tax system's own policy framework requires some recognition of the costs
of disability. Most would agree that the expenses of coping with disability are
non-discretionary, at least to some basic standard, and that such costs therefore reduce
the ability to pay tax of those who must bear them. To ignore these extra expenses in
computing tax liability would violate the tax policy principle of horizontal equity, that
people with the same ability to pay should bear the same amount of tax.6 1 Thus even
57. Berman, supra note 5 at 989.
58. See J.R. Kesselman, "Direct Expenditures versus Tax Expenditures for Economic and Social Policy"
in N. Bruce, ed., Tax Expenditures and Government Policy (Kingston: John Deutch Institute for the
Study of Economic Policy, Queen's University, 1988) 283 at 298.
59. See F. Stairs, "'he Canada Child Tax Benefit: Income Support and the Tax System" (1999) 14 J. L
Soc. Pol'y 123 at 144-46.
60. See, for example, Government of Canada Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2000, supra note 34.
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if all public disability supports were delivered outside the tax system through direct
transfers or state provision of goods and services, there would still be a need to
recognize any privately borne costs of disability in some fashion in determining
relative tax burdens.62 To put this another way, if a decision was taken that no public
resources should be used to support high-income people with disabilities, tax policy
principles would still suggest it is unfair for such individuals to pay the same amount
of tax on their incomes as those who have no disability-related expenses. Some
disability-related tax measures are needed, in other words, just to cohere with the
internal logic and objectives of the tax system.
While tax policy principles such as horizontal equity are often distinguished concep-
tually from social policy goals such as income security,63 the two cannot be entirely
disentangled. Determining what expenses are non-discretionary, in particular, involves
normative judgments about what minimum quality of life people with disabilities must
be able to enjoy before they are considered to have excess economic capacity that is
properly subject to tax. The decision to refund tax deductions or credits to those who
are below the horizon of tax liability can be understood as a natural extension of this
moral judgment about basic acceptable living standards. In any event, whether it is
justified in terms of tax policy or social policy, the tax system can be used to advance
objectives such as reducing poverty, increasing autonomy, and promoting social and
economic integration for people with disabilities.
Certainly people with disabilities have lobbied very actively for tax reforms over the
last two decades. 64 Some of this work has been in reaction to restrictive interpretations
of existing tax provisions by revenue authorities or courts. However, advocacy groups
have gone well beyond this to call for more fundamental reform of the tax system as
it relates to people with disabilities. Several reasons have been posited in the literature
for this increasing focus on tax reform within the disability rights movement. There
is significant frustration that welfare and other income security programs have been
so resistant to reform and so vulnerable to cutbacks in recent years. 65 As well, tax
benefits are often viewed as a less stigmatized form of support than direct transfers,
especially social assistance. 66 Felicite Stairs has documented the ways in which
taxpayers are treated as honest, rights-bearing citizens entitled to privacy, trust, and
fair treatment by bureaucrats, compared to welfare recipients for whom these social
citizenship rights are often suspended.67 Being treated with dignity and respect is
61. See Ontari6 Fair Tax Commission, supra note 49 at 312-13.
62. See Duff, supra note 5 at 804-808.
63. See Kesselman, supra note 58 at 302.
64. See Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Disabled Persons, supra note 5 at 5-8.
65. See Ontario Fair Tax Commission, supra note 49, at 313; and Michael Prince, Tax Policy as Social
Policy: Canadian Tax Assistance for People with Disabilities (University of Victoria, 2000) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author) at 11-12.
66. See Sherri TorJman, Will the Children's Budget Include Kids with Disabilities? (Ottawa: Caledon
Institute, 1999) at 6.
67. Supra note 59 at 136-41.
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important to all low-income people but may have particular significance for people
with disabilities. The relative impersonality and universality of tax-filing requirements
may contribute to this lack of stigma, compared to welfare programs, which apply
only to the disadvantaged and require far more personal contact with administrative
officials. Stairs cautions that tax-based benefits may become more stigmatized and
intrusive over time, noting that revenue authorities have already come under pressure
to institute monitoring and enforcement systems for the Canada child tax benefit akin
to those used by welfare authorities.68
Finally, the shift away from public provision of services toward more privatized
models of caregiving by families and community agencies may help to explain the
rising appeal of tax assistance. 69 Tax deductions and credits do not require govern-
ments to provide goods or services to people with disabilities or those who support
them. Rather, they provide a partial subsidy for the privately borne costs of disability.
So they effect a sharing of costs between people with disabilities and governments. 70
While overall this trend clearly disadvantages low-income people with disabilities,
the pursuit of tax concessions has at least offered a way of mitigating the offloading
of disability-related costs onto individuals and families. Similarly, a refundable tax
credit could provide individuals with cash income to offset at least part of the cost of
securing private supports, while the struggle for adequate public services continues.
Tax-based delivery of disability supports also has some notable drawbacks and
dangers, from the perspective of both governments and people with disabilities. Tax
expenditure programs in general are notoriously susceptible to poor cost control and
a lack of transparency as to how benefits are distributed and whether policy objectives
have been attained. 71 Unlike a direct spending program with a specified budget
allocation, there is no upper limit to the potential cost of offering a tax deduction or
credit. Policy makers have tools for estimating the likely take-up rate and cost of tax
concessions, but if such projections are mistaken, there is no discretionary power in
the administration of the ITA to accept only a limited number of claims. Moreover,-
distributive effects that would be glaringly problematic in a direct-spending program
tend to be far less visible in a tax-based measure. For example, a transfer or granting
program that purported to assist all people with disabilities but explicitly excluded
those with incomes less than $7,412 would likely come under attack fairly quickly.
However, the same effect when created by the non-refundable DTC is totally obscured
to most members of the public. The risks of non-transparency may be less in the case
of a refundable credit that involves actual payments from government to individuals
and is designed and justified explicitly in terms of measurable policy objectives such
as the reduction of poverty among people with disabilities. By contrast, most new tax
expenditures are accompanied by only the vaguest justifications about encouraging
68. Id., at 152.
69. Id., at 12-13.
70. Baker and Beatty, supra note 5, at 4.
71. See N. Brooks, "Comment" in N. Bruce, ed., Tax Expenditures and Government Policy, supra note
58, 324, at 325-29.
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certain types of economic activity or assisting certain groups. Certainly it would be
wise for the designers of a refundable disability credit to build in requirements for
regular reviews of its policy effectiveness and distributive impact. People with disabilities
from outside government should be involved in conducting these reviews, and their
results should be made public.
Another limitation of the tax system as an instrument for delivering disability supports
is the sluggish and inflexible annual assessment cycle. Tax is assessed for individuals
each calendar year through a process that is not completed until several months after
the end of each year. Deductions or credits often will not translate into a tax refund
until more than a year after an expenditure was incurred. This is especially problematic
for those low-income people who lack the cash to finance expenditures or to carry
them for months or years pending reimbursement. Some refundable credits such as
the Canada Child Tax Benefit have mitigated this problem by determining each year's
benefits in advance, based on the taxpayer's income in previous years, and paying the
credit in periodic instalments throughout the year.72 However, this means that benefit
calculations are always based on out-of-date information. In the case of the Canada
Child Tax Benefit, there is at least a year's lag time between a change in the taxpayer's
income and an adjustment in benefits. Social assistance is far more responsive and
flexible, by contrast, allowing for benefits to be adjusted monthly as income from other
sources rises or falls, and for extra one-time payments to deal with crises or extraordinary
expenses.73 The tax system in general lacks this capacity to respond very quickly to urgent
needs, a function that is critically important to the poorest individuals. 74
There are serious concerns as well about the administration of disability-related tax
expenditures by revenue authorities. While the efficiency of utilizing an established
administrative structure is one of the advantages of tax-based programs, it is also a
weakness, because the administrative mandate and technical training of revenue
authorities is not well suited to delivering a disability support program. As an
institution oriented toward maximizing revenue collections and administering a wide
range of tax expenditure programs, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency is
unlikely to have the specialized knowledge or flexibility to apply a disability support
program liberally and generously in keeping with its objectives. Nor is the tax system
procedurally very accessible for non-expert members of the public. The technical
complexity of the ITA discourages some individuals from claiming tax benefits at all
and makes it difficult for others to verify how much they should be receiving. 75 This
72. The Canada Child Tax Benefit is paid monthly. Entitlement to the benefit and the amount of
payments depends on the taxpayer's income (combined with any income earned by a spouse) for the
second preceding calendar year (for January to June benefits), and the immediately preceding calen-
dar year (for July to December benefits): s. 122.6 "base taxation year," and 122.61(1). The GST
credit is paid quarterly, beginning in July of each year, based on income in the immediately preced-
ing calendar year: s. 122.5(3),(4).
73. Stairs, supra note 59 at 159-60.
74. Baker and Beatty, supra note 5 at 4.
75. See Berman, supra note 5; Katz, supra note 37, at 690-91; and Stairs, supra note 59, at 144-45.
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leads to costly disputes that must be worked out through an appeal process that is far
slower, less accessible, and more technical than a social assistance appeal.76 To be
successful, a refundable tax credit for people with disabilities would have to be
accompanied by substantial administrative reforms. Revenue agencies would need to
ensure they have staff who are knowledgeable about the diverse circumstances and
needs of people with disabilities, and would need to involve people with disabilities
themselves in designing and operating administrative systems. Taxpayer education
and assistance programs would also be essential.
2. Constitutional Hurdles: Coordination of Federal Tax Benefits with Provincial
Welfare Programs
In addition to their pitfalls as policy instruments, tax-based income-support programs
raise daunting problems of intergovernmental coordination. This is because the federal
government, though it has clear constitutional authority to enact a refundable credit,
could not prevent the provinces from treating the credit as income for social-assistance
purposes and reducing welfare benefits accordingly. 77 For example, all but two
provinces, New Brunswick and Newfoundland, claw back social assistance from those
receiving the Canada Child Tax Benefit. The National Council of Welfare has esti-
mated that as a result of this clawback, only 36% of poor families with children have
experienced any net increase in income by virtue of the Canada Child Tax Benefit,
and in the case of single parents only 17% have been net beneficiaries. 78 While
provinces agreed under the joint National Child Benefit initiative to reinvest any
welfare savings in other programs for families with children, those reinvestments have
been selective, often focusing on the "working poor" to the exclusion of those on
welfare and difficult to track.79 Unless a refundable disability credit was higher than
provincial welfare rates, or the provinces agreed not to claw it back from social-assis-
tance recipients, one of the most disadvantaged groups of people with disabilities
76. Stairs, id, at 149-51.
77. The Constitution Act, 1867 gives comprehensive taxing powers to the federal government, and more
limited, concurrent taxing powers to the provinces: ss. 91(3), 92(2). However, the provinces have
exclusive authority over most social-welfare matters. This misfit between revenue-raising powers
and spending responsibilities has been resolved historically through the transfer of federal funds to
finance provincial programs. See M. Young, "The Constitutionalisation of the Private" (draft on file
with author, February 2001) at 3-4.
78. National Council of Welfare, Child Benefits: Kids Are Still Hungry (Ottawa: Minister of Public
Works and Government Services Canada, 1998) at 9, 10.
79. Id at 19-25; Stairs, supra note 59 at 163. Some have defended the decision to focus new child
benefits on low-wage families to the exclusion of social-assistance families as a means of lowering
the "welfare wall," referring to the possible disincentives to paid labour caused by the loss of health
benefits and other in-kind benefits upon leaving the welfare system: see, for example, K. Battle,
"Child Benefit Reform: A Case Study in Tax-Transfer Integration" (1999) 47 Canadian Tax Journal
1219, at 1232-38. Others have responded that the total exclusion of social-assistance families
severely undermines a major objective of the National Child Benefit, to reduce child poverty, and
that the welfare wall could be lowered in other ways without neglecting those still on welfare, such
as by extending in-kind benefits to low-wage families: see, for example, R. Shillington, "Assessing
Tax-Transfer Programs: Comments on the Paper by Ken Battle" (1999) 47 Canadian Tax Journal
1263; and Stairs, supra note 59 at 164.
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would receive no net benefit. 80 Indeed, some would be worse off, because the tax
credit would replace their entitlement to social assistance altogether, and hence they
would lose access to the emergency funding and supplementary health, child care, and
other benefits provided through the welfare system.8'
The danger that refundable credits would simply substitute federal for provincial
money without increasing support levels to those on welfare may be viewed as an
argument against using the tax system to deliver income support. Indeed, the Ontario
Fair Tax Commission gave this as one of its reasons for opposing tax-based disability
supports altogether, and recommending instead that Ontario provide direct transfer
payments or subsidies outside the tax system for people with disabilities. 82 This type
of direct income support could be provided unilaterally by any individual province
willing to pay the full cost on its own, avoiding the need to coordinate benefits across
two levels of government. If the goal is to create a pan-Canadian disability income
support program, funded jointly by both levels of government, a direct spending
program would pose at least as many coordination challenges as a refundable tax
credit.
In past times, the federal government was able to exert considerable influence over
the nature of provincially delivered social programs and services. However, in recent
years it has ceded much of this power, as the Canadian welfare state has evolved
sharply toward a more decentralized model in which the provinces are seen as the
more legitimate authors of social policy, and federal intervention is increasingly
resisted.8 3 This shift initially coincided with dramatic cutbacks in federal transfer
payments in the mid-1990s, as the Liberal government made deficit reduction its main
fiscal priority, but it has continued into the era of federal budget surpluses. Until 1995
the federal government could impose conditions on social program funding to the
80. According to Fawcett, approximately 9.7% of people with disabilities relied at least in part on social
assistance in 1991. Comparing poverty rates among people with disabilities who receive their
income from different sources, she concluded that those on social assistance had by far the greatest
likelihood of being poor, with 64% living below Statistics Canada's low-income cut-offs: supra note
4, at 145-46. More recent data from 1999 indicate that the level of welfare benefits received by
single persons with disabilities fell well short of the poverty line, ranging from 42% in Alberta to
70% in Ontario: National Council of Welfare, supra note 25 at 23-26.
81. Stairs, supra note 59 at 154.
82. Supra note 49 at 316-21. When the Commission reported in 1993, these recommendations were
moot, because the Tax Collection Agreements between the federal government and all-provinces
except Quebec required provincial governments to levy their income taxes simply as a flat percent-
age of federal tax payable, severely limiting their control over tax policy. The Tax Collection
Agreements have since been amended to allow provinces to design their own rate structures and tax
credits. The provinces have undertaken to maintain non-refundable credits from the federal system,
such as the DTC, at no less than their 1997 values, but they are not bound to match post-1997
increases in the DTC. Thus they could decide to devote' funding instead to new direct-spending
programs for people with disabilities, as recommended by the Ontario Fair Tax Commission. The
provinces have less flexibility on expenditure-based credits such as the METC, which must keep
pace with any increases enacted federally. See Canada, Department of Finance, Federal Administra-
tion of Provincial Taxes: New Directions (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, January 2000).
83. See R. Boadway, "Delivering the Social Union" (November 1998) Policy Options 37.
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provinces, under the legal framework of the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP). The CAP
was abolished in 1995 and replaced by the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST),
a virtually unconditional block transfer payment that each province can use to finance
social programs of its own choosing. Whereas CAP may have been an effective vehicle
for the federal government to initiate a new shared-cost income support program for
people with disabilities, the CHST is not. There are no guarantees that new CHST
monies would be used by any province for any purpose remotely related to federal
policy objectives. 84
The reduced federal role in social programming was further concretized by the 1999
Social Union Framework Agreement in which the federal government accepted
restrictions on the exercise of its constitutional spending power.85 Specifically, it
undertook not to introduce any new conditionally funded programs outside the CHST
in the areas of health care, post-secondary education, social assistance, or social
services, without first obtaining agreement from half the provinces. Even if provincial
consent is secured, the federal government may not develop programs unilaterally but
is bound to work jointly with the provinces to determine objectives, priorities, and any
accountability measures such as national standards. A province also has the right to
opt out of such initiatives and to receive equivalent federal funding, provided it has
programs that address the same or related objectives.
Under the system envisioned by the Social Union Framework Agreement, the federal
government could offer funding to the provinces for a disability support program that
would be financed separately from the CHST. It could be delivered through federal or
provincial legislation, but in either case the broad parameters would have to be
developed jointly by both levels of government. Any province that did not approve of
the jointly negotiated program could opt out and simply take its share of the money.
If more than half the provinces objected to the program, they could block the initiative
entirely. The risks for the federal government of pursuing this avenue include the risk
of deadlock or failure to reach agreement, and the risk that no coherent program would
emerge across the country, but rather a series of quite different local programs.
Certainly the federal government would have less control over the design and delivery
of a shared-cost program than over a refundable tax credit, which it could legislate
directly. The one form of unilateral social spending left open to the federal government
under the Social Union Framework Agreement is to bypass provincial structures
entirely and simply make transfer payments directly to individuals with disabilities.
A straight transfer payment could not be vetoed by the provinces, though they are
entitled to be notified and consulted about the development of the program. Again,
however, the provinces would be free to claw back any federal transfer payment from
social assistance, leaving welfare recipients with no net benefit and possibly worse
off.
84. See S. Day and G. Brodsky, Women and the Equality Deficit: The Impact of Restructuring on
Canada's Social Programs (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, March 1998) at 5-42.
85. See M. Young, "The Social Union Framework Agreement: Hollowing Out the State" (1999) 10
Constitutional Forum 120.
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What this discussion has shown is that any new income-support program for low-
income people with disabilities, if it is to be available in some form everywhere in the
country, would pose significant challenges to intergovernmental coordination.
Whether delivered federally or provincially, in the form of a refundable tax credit or
a direct spending program, its details would have to be developed jointly by negotia-
tion between the two levels of government if it was to have any hope of fulfilling its
objectives, particularly in relation to those on social assistance. These are the new
constitutional facts of life in Canada, and in themselves they give no advantage to
direct-spending programs over tax-based benefits.
Part III considers design features that could help to overcome these constitutional
hurdles as well as the tax system's limitations as a policy instrument, discussed in the
previous section. The seriousness of these limitations suggests, however, that we
should not aim to rely exclusively on refundable tax credits to address all the unmet
needs of low-income people with disabilities. At best they should be seen as a partial
strategy that must be coordinated with better direct-spending programs. 86 It is espe-
cially difficult to see how refundable tax credits could ever meet the need for
emergency or discretionary one-time payments. Further, Torjman has observed that
tax-relief deals only with the "demand side" of accessing disability-related goods and
services, and argues that " ... helping parents pay for services is important-but is
not a complete answer . . . There must be sufficient and appropriate services to
purchase. An investment in the supply of supports and services . . . is crucial. 87
Similarly, individualized tax benefits by themselves cannot ensure that public and
private institutions will work to accommodate and fully include people with disabili-
ties. Clearly, therefore, tax-based benefits would need to be complemented by more
direct forms of subsidization, regulation, and intervention.
III. DESIGNING REFUNDABLE DISABILITY TAX CREDITS: THREE
MODELS OF REFORM
If and when governments become persuaded that refundable tax credits are needed for
people with disabilities, how exactly should such a program be designed? A multitude
of different options and features can be envisioned. However, three broad conceptual
models of reform can initially be identified. The most incremental type of reform
would simply rework existing refundable credits to address some specific needs of
people with disabilities. A second, more ambitious approach would add refundability
to existing disability-related tax provisions. The third and most appealing option is to
start fresh and build a new refundable credit program that would improve upon and
replace at least some of the current provisions.
Before elaborating on these reform options, it is necessary to clarify the policy
objectives that might be pursued through a refundable tax credit. The ideal form of
credit will depend in large part on what needs it is meant to address, exactly who is
86. Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Disabled Persons, supra note 5 at 10.
87. Supra note 66 at 5.
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intended to benefit, and to what extent policy makers wish to address other well-doc-
umented gaps and problems in the ITA's treatment of disability. Section A considers
how each of these objectives might be refined in a way that is sensitive to differences
of class, race, and gender among people with disabilities. Section B then goes on to
flesh out and evaluate the three models of reform suggested in this paper.
A. Clarifying the Objectives of a Refundable Disability Credit
1. What Needs Should Be Addressed?
Literature on disability programming generally identifies three distinct, but inter-
dependent categories of need: (i) income support, (ii) access to disability-related goods
and services, and (iii) economic and social integration. The first category-income
support-can be broken down further into two objectives: reducing poverty and
enhancing autonomy. The most appropriate design of a refundable credit would
depend partly on the relative priority attached to addressing these different needs, and
to the interplay among them. For example, it is difficult to untangle the first and second
types of need, because income-support requirements depend so heavily on the cost of
disability-related goods and services needed by a particular individual. Thus a flat,
income-tested benefit might be viable as a means of providing income support to
non-disabled individuals, but would be an extremely blunt instrument for assisting
people with disabilities. Because the costs of living with a disability vary so dramat-
ically, and also because some types of disability income are excluded from the tax
base, income as defined in the ITA would be a highly unreliable indicator of actual
need. A credit aimed only at providing income support for the poorest would have to
measure eligibility in a way that both excluded those people with significant levels of
non-taxable income, and included those with significant taxable income that was
consumed largely by unreimbursed disability-related expenses. To be an effective
anti-poverty measure, such a credit would also need to provide supplementary benefits
for extraordinary disability-related costs.
Integration objectives will also interact with needs for income support and access to
goods and services. Refundable credits that cover the cost of certain support services,
for example, would also facilitate labour market and other forms of social and
economic integration. An important issue here concerns the meaning of integration,
which too often is limited to labour force participation. A commitment to full social
and economic citizenship for people with disabilities requires a far broader concept
of integration, for example into the non-profit sector, electoral politics, education
systems, and caregiving roles within families. Feminist and anti-racist writers on
disability have pointed out that a single-minded focus on employment incentives
disadvantages women and radicalized people who face greater employment discrim-
ination and have fewer employment opportunities. 88 It also discounts the need and
88. See A. Vernon, "A Stranger in Many Camps: The Experience of Disabled Black and Ethnic Minority
Women" in J. Morris, ed., Encounters with Strangers: Feminism and Disability (London: The
Women's Press Ltd., 1996) 48; and O.W. Stuart, "Race and Disability: Just a Double Oppression?"
(1992) 7 Disability, Handicap & Society 177 at 186.
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desire of many people with disabilities, especially women, to care for their children
or other family members, and the supports they need to do so.89 Even feminist
literature on women's unpaid caregiving work, for example, has generally subsumed
women with disabilities "under the universal 'cared-for' . . . assumed as part of the
burden contributing to women's secondary or privatized status," 90 rather than consid-
ering the specific interests and needs of mothers and other caregivers with disabilities.
A brief look at the ITA demonstrates both how it devalues unpaid care work generally,
and how it constructs people with disabilities stereotypically as the recipients of care,
while ignoring their responsibilities as caregivers. For example, attendant care expenses
are fully deductible to a taxpayer only if they enable income-earning or educational
activities, not if they enable unpaid caregiving activities. 91 Likewise, an enhanced
child-care expense deduction was created for parents of a disabled child in 2000, but
not for parents with disabilities, despite the fact that parents with disabilities may have
to incur extra child-care costs in order to engage in business or employment.92 Another
example is the caregiver credit, which gives tax relief to those who reside with an
elderly or infirm relative, apparently on the assumption that the relative is always the
recipient and never the provider of care for grandchildren, siblings, or others.93 If they
wish to promote integration in a way that avoids class, gender, and racial biases, policy
makers should eliminate assumptions that people with disabilities have no caregiving
responsibilities of their own, as well as narrow understandings of integration that value
market activity but not unpaid contributions to the social and economic life of the
country.
Careful thought is also needed about how best to support participation in employment
and other activities. For example, one drawback of income-tested credits is that they
necessarily impose high effective marginal tax rates on income around the level where
the credit begins to disappear.94 That is, a person who earns employment income just
over the amount defined as the threshold for entitlement to a refundable credit bears
89. See L. Keith & J. Morris, "Easy Targets: A Disability Rights Perspective on the 'Children as Carers'
Debate" in J. Morris, ed., Id. 89; J. Morris, "Introduction" in Id& 1 at 10-11; A. Silvers, "Reconciling
Equality to Difference: Caring (F)or Justice for People with Disabilities" (1995) 10 Hypatia 30; and
S. Tremain, Constructions of the Gendered Body and Disability: A Literature Review (prepared for
the project "'he Legal Regulation and Construction of the Gendered Body and Disability in Cana-
dian Health Law and Policy," funded by the National Network on Environments and Women's
Health, draft dated September 1999).
90. H. Meekosha, "Body Battles: Bodies, Gender and Disability" in T. Shakespeare, ed., The Disability
Reader (London and New York: Cassell, 1998) 163 at 165.
91. S. 64, discussed at note 26, supra and associated text. Though such expenses might be claimed by a
caregiver under the non-refundable METC (discussed supra at notes 42 and 43 and associated text),
that credit is available only for medical expenses exceeding a defined annual threshold and is granted
at the lowest marginal tax rate of 16%, whereas the deduction for attendant-care expenses has no
threshold and its value rises with the taxpayer's actual marginal rate.
92. S. 63, discussed supra at note 27 and associated text.
93. S. 118(1)(c. 1), discussed supra at notes 53 and 54 and associated text.
94. See K. Battle, supra note 79, at 1238-44; and F. Woolley and A. Vermaeten, "Ending Universality:
The Case of Child Benefits" (1996) 22 Canadian Public Policy 24.
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not only the explicit marginal income-tax rate on her last dollar of income, but also
loses some or all of her refundable credit, so that she may realize little or no net benefit
from increasing her wage income. Marginal tax rates are only one of many factors
affecting work choices. However, people with disabilities, who may incur extra
transportation, equipment, or personal-service costs to engage in paid work, may be
more sensitive to the loss of benefits, and whether a job actually produces any net
increase in household income. Indeed, because of these extra costs, a credit designed
to improve labour-market access might have to rise when a claimant enters paid labour,
rather than fall.
In light of the close interrelationships among all three categories of need, policy
makers designing a refundable tax credit should ideally aim to address all three, or at
least to avoid cross interference among them. It may be possible to achieve this with
a single refundable credit that had multiple components, to ensure, for example, that
income-support needs were determined only after the cost of disability-related goods
and services had been credited. Another approach would be to address some needs
through a refundable credit, while maintaining other types of provisions better suited
to meeting other needs. Finally, it is unlikely that these needs can be fully met by tax
relief or other cash transfers to individuals with disabilities themselves. Other steps
must be taken as well, inside or outside the tax system, to induce others to accommo-.
date people with disabilities. This raises the question of who should be targeted to
receive refundable tax credits.
2. To Whom Should Refundable Tax Credits Be Delivered?
Policy makers designing refundable credits would need to define clearly their target
group or groups. A non-exhaustive list of possible targets includes:
" low-income people with disabilities
" all adults with disabilities
" children with disabilities
" people with disabilities who engage in paid work, or more broadly in unpaid
caregiving, volunteer work, educational pursuits, or other activities considered
valuable
" individuals who provide financial support to someone with a disability
" individuals who provide unpaid care to someone with a disability
" businesses that employ or provide access to goods or services for people with
disabilities
" other institutions to which people with disabilities need better access
Other target groups could be imagined. The point is that, in order to choose the most
appropriate model and develop it effectively, policy makers will need to be clear about
who is (and who is not) intended to benefit, and why. For example, existing non-
refundable credits such as the infirm-dependants credit, METC, and DTC can be
claimed by or transferred to those who provide financial support to people with
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disabilities. Rather than paying anything to financial providers, however, refunding
amounts directly to individuals with disabilities seems more consistent with the goals
of reducing poverty and enhancing autonomy. On the other hand, a good case can be
made for providing refundable credits to small businesses and other institutions to
help finance more vigorous action to accommodate disabilities. Including these actors
in the target group for refundable credits seems consistent with the social model of
disability developed in social science literature, which calls for a focus on "disabling
barriers" and "disabling environments," rather than locating all responsibility for
overcoming disadvantage and exclusion with individuals who have physical or mental
impairments. 95 As for people with disabilities themselves, there are good arguments
for a universal refundable credit, rather than one targeted exclusively at those with
low incomes or those who engage in income-earning or other specified activities. The
reasons are discussed in more detail in the final section of the paper, but essentially
they relate to avoiding stigma and rationalizing the system.
The choice of beneficiaries should also be made in a way that avoids subtle gender,
race, and other biases. For example, providing refundable credits to those who enter
paid work but not to those engaged in unpaid caregiving, whether by or for people
with disabilities, would discriminate against women, especially women who forego
or severely restrict their own income-earning activities in order to provide care.
Incentives for employment to the exclusion of other activities may also be biased
against those who lack opportunities in the paid labour force due to discrimination
based on race, age, or the perceived severity of their disability. The objective should
be to provide supports for people with disabilities to participate in any and all aspects
of social and economic life, rather than creating categories of deserving and undeserv-
ing claimants based on financial independence from government.
3. Addressing Other Gaps and Problems in the System
In addition to the lack of refundability, a wide range of other gaps and problems have
been identified in the current tax treatment of disability. Though refundability could
simply be grafted onto existing provisions, it would be sensible in designing a
refundable credit to take the opportunity to rationalize the system and close as many
gaps as possible. It is beyond the scope of this paper to itemize these problems in
detail, but several common themes can be identified in the literature:
" The first relates to the eligibility criteria for the DTC, which in turn controls
access to other tax benefits such as the infirm-dependants credit and the atten-
dant-care expense deduction. The definition has been criticized for treating
disability as an "either/or" status, ignoring people with less severe yet still costly
disabilities, or with degenerative or episodic conditions that do not meet the
statutory requirement for continuous disability.
" A second pervasive theme relates to the current system's overly medicalized
model of disability. Thus health professionals must be involved in certifying facts
95. See, for example, C. Barnes, "The Social Model of Disability: A Sociological Phenomenon Ignored
by Sociologists?" in T. Shakespeare, supra note 90, 65.
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that may not call for technical expertise but can best be gleaned from ordinary
observation of an individual. Likewise, expenses for care or equipment that can
be construed as medical are recognized more easily than crucial expenses of
ordinary life, such as housekeeping and shopping. And the multivarious costs of
living with a disability are lumped in with "medical expenses" for purposes of
the METC. The medical model of disability has been contrasted with a broader
and more inclusive citizenship model, in which supports would be designed to
promote full participation in all aspects of social, economic, and political life.96
" A third and related criticism is that the current system has an institutional bias,
in that costs of full-time care in a specialized residential institution or for
professional caregivers are recognized more generously than the costs of receiv-
ing help in an integrated setting or from unpaid family members.
" A fourth theme, overlapping with the third, is the tendency to under-recognize
family caregivers, most often women, who bear substantial indirect costs, includ-
ing lost income-earning opportunities and lost leisure time, and who have unmet
needs of their own for income support, respite services, and more extensive
replacement care that would improve their access to labour markets and employ-
ment benefits such as retirement pensions. This issue is especially pressing for
families that rely heavily on women's wages, including some ethnic minority and
racialized families, due to labour market barriers for male family members.97
" A fifth critique is that existing provisions fail the narrower tax-policy tests of
horizontal and vertical equity. For example, the METC has been criticized on the
basis that it tends to give the greatest benefit to higher-income people who can
afford medical purchases over and beyond the 3% income threshold, and some-
times gives different amounts of tax relief to households with the same total
incomes, depending on how the income is split between spouses. 98
" Sixth, there is frequent critical comment on the low amount of existing credits
and their failure to recognize all the costs of disability or to reimburse a sufficient
share of those costs.
" Seventh are concerns about the complexity of the current network of interrelated
tax provisions, the difficulty that taxpayers have in determining their entitle-
ments, and inconsistent or unclear application of these provisions by administra-
tive officials. Many proposals call for rationalization of several provisions into
a single tax benefit, better communication of what is available, and more
accessible and inclusive appeal and other administrative procedures.
96. See Federal/Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Social Services, In Unison: A Canadian
Approach to Disability Issues ((Hull, QC: Human Resources Development Canada, 1998).
97. See Stuart, supra note 88 at 186.
98. See Shiflington, supra note 5; and discussion at notes 42 and 43, supra and associated text.
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• Finally, people with disabilities have emphasized that it is critical to include them
in discussions about tax reform and in the administration of disability-related tax
provisions.
Drawing on this discussion of policy objectives, I now turn to an assessment of three
alternative models for the development of refundable disability credits in the tax
system.
B. Three Models of Reform
The preceding sections of this paper have shown that refundable credits for people
with disabilities could focus on any number of specific objectives and target groups,
and could take a variety of forms. In this final section I concretize the discussion by
fleshing out three models of reform. Starting with the most incremental and working
up to the most ambitious, they are:
1. Rework existing refundable credits to take better account of disability-related
needs
2. Add refundability to existing disability-related deductions and credits
3. Create a new refundable tax credit that would improve upon and replace a num-
ber of existing disability-related provisions
I evaluate each of these approaches in light of the objectives discussed in the preceding
section: reducing poverty, enhancing autonomy, providing access to disability-related
goods and services, and integrating people with disabilities more fully into all aspects
of society. I also consider how well each model coheres with conventional tax-policy
objectives, especially equity and simplicity. Concluding that the third model-creat-
ing an entirely new refundable credit-is by far the most attractive, I go on to discuss
some of the specific design issues it would raise, particularly the choice between
universal versus targeted benefits. I review two examples of targeted refundable
credits: Canada's National Child Benefit and Britain's Disabled Person's Tax Credit.
I argue that a universal credit applicable to all Canadians with disabilities is more
desirable and could still be designed to distribute more resources to those with lower
incomes.
1. Rework Existing Refundable Credits to Take Better Account of
Disability-Related Needs
This model is by definition quite limited in scope, because the ITA contains only a few
refundable credits, all designed for specific purposes. Certainly the refundable medi-
cal-expense supplement could be enhanced. 99 Duff has argued that the narrow purpose
of this supplement-to offset the loss of provincial disability supports upon entering
paid work--could be more effectively achieved by eliminating the METC's threshold
requirement that medical expenses exceed 3% of annual income or a specified dollar
minimum, and by covering a fuller range of disability-related expenses.100 Other ways
99. Discussed supra at note 55 and associated text.
100. Supra note 5 at 868-69.
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of making the supplement more generous would be to increase the 25% rate at which
expenses are credited, to remove the $520 maximum annual refund, and to raise the
amount of income that can be earned before the supplement is lost. More ambitiously,
the supplement could be extended to those who participate not just in paid employment
or self-employment but in a broader range of social and economic activities such as unpaid
caregiving, education, volunteer work, or political campaigning. This enhancement would
recognize some of the extra costs for low-income people with disabilities of participating
fully as citizens. In this case, it would also make sense to remove the requirement that
claimants earn at least $2,598 of employment or self-employment income.
This option is consistent with the incrementalist approach to disability tax reform that
has prevailed over the last two decades. It may be achievable with relatively little
political energy and may contribute to establishing a principle of refundability that
could gradually extend to other disability-related provisions. It is focused strongly on
integration objectives, offering income support and subsidizing goods and services
only for those who participate in specified activities. Thus, it would exclude some of
the poorest and most isolated people with disabilities who are not active in the
particular ways recognized by the provision. For the original target group-those
leaving welfare for employment-it still may do little more than offset the loss of
in-kind welfare benefits. Nor would it increase support to those-with incomes too high
to qualify for the supplement who can claim only the non-refundable METC. Many
of these individuals may also be under-compensated by the tax system for tremendous
disability-related costs of entering paid employment or other pursuits. Finally, if the
supplement was extended to those on social assistance, the provinces may simply claw
it back. In short, this option may be worthy on its own terms but could benefit only a
narrowly defined group of individuals who have low incomes from sources other than
social assistance, and who also participate in specified activities.
Alternatively, some have recommended that the Canada Child Tax Benefit should be
enhanced to recognize the extra costs of caring for children with disabilities, in one
or more of the following ways: 101
" increase the amount of benefits for families who already qualify and have a child
with a disability
" raise the income threshold at which benefits are reduced for families who have
a child with a disability
* reduce the rate at which benefits vanish above the income threshold for such
families
" extend the age of eligibility, perhaps to age 25, where children remain dependent
on their parents due to a disability 0 2
101. The Canadian Association for Community Living, Preliminary Proposal to Create an Enhanced
National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS) for Families Who Have Children with a Disability
(North York, ON: Canadian Association for Community Living, 1998).
102. Torjman, supra note 66 at 6.
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This proposal has the advantage of working from within an existing refundable credit
program with an established framework of intergovernmental cooperation through the
National Child Benefit. As discussed in Part II, however, this framework severely
limits the program's capacity to reduce poverty, because social-assistance recipients
are denied most of its benefits through provincial clawbacks. Worse, some families
also lose access to welfare's emergency and in-kind benefits, because they now receive
the Canada Child Tax Benefit instead. For people with disabilities, the loss of in-kind
health and other benefits could be especially disastrous. Though provinces agreed to
reinvest their welfare savings in related programs, they have strongly preferred to
benefit wage-earning families rather than those on social assistance. Provinces could
be approached to make an exception to the clawback for any supplement aimed at
children with disabilities, but this may well be resisted, given the current anti-welfare
environment in many provinces and the fact that welfare benefits are paid to non-dis-
abled parents of these children.
The proposal for flat-rate disability enhancements to the Canada Child Tax Benefit
has also been criticized by Torjman, because costs vary so dramatically among
families, depending on the nature and severity of disability.103 Eligibility for the Child
Tax Benefit is based on a simple income test that does not measure individual
household costs or actual needs (Torjman notes that this is generally a strength of the
program). Accordingly, the proposed enhancements would under-compensate low- or
middle-income families with high disability-related costs, while overcompensating
others. It would also leave out some families with taxable incomes too high to qualify
even for an enhanced Child Tax Benefit but whose discretionary incomes, after paying
for disability-related expenses, may be very modest. In other words, it would be
impossible to set the amount of the supplement or the income-testing criteria at a level
appropriate for all children with disabilities. The difficulties of adapting flat-rate,
income-tested benefits to the disability context are discussed further in relation to the
third model of reform, below. A final point is that even if these problems could be
overcome through more radical revisions to the National Child Benefit, this strategy
would do nothing to assist the many low-income people with disabilities who have no
children or whose children have grown up. In light of the relatively large proportion
of people with disabilities who are older, an enhancement to the Canada Child Tax
Benefit would exclude much of the target population.
2. Add Refundability to Existing Disability-Related Deductions and Credits
Under this approach, the ITA would be amended to add refundability to all or some of
the existing deductions and credits aimed at people with disabilities, so that they could
be claimed as a payment from the federal government by those who have little or no
tax liability in a particular year. This option has the advantage of being relatively
simple and straightforward, and not requiring extensive redesign of the legislation. If
extended to all deductions and credits, it could substantially improve the equity of the
103. Id. Note that Torjman does agree with the idea of raising the age limit to 25 for disabled children
who remain dependent.
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current system. It could speak to all three areas of need, at least to some degree, by
providing basic income support to taxpayers living in poverty or without their own
independent sources of income (through the DTC), subsidizing out-of-pocket costs
for disability-related goods and services needed by the poorest consumers (through
the METC), and facilitating labour market participation (through the deductions for
employer accommodations and attendant care expenses). The DTC refund, as the main
income-support component of the system, could be paid periodically in advance, based
on the previous years' tax information. This would address some of the cash-flow
problems of low-income people, but of course the benefit could not be adjusted quickly
in response to in-year changes in need.
This approach also has the advantage of potentially reaching other target groups
besides people with disabilities themselves, including caregivers and the owners of
businesses who accommodate employees, customers, or others with disabilities.
Refunding the caregiver credit directly to those primarily responsible for providing
care to individuals with disabilities would better recognize the value of this work and
offset a small portion of the costs borne by this group. Note, however, that the caregiver
credit would have to be amended to link it expressly to the provision of care, rather
than simply co-residence. By contrast, it likely is not desirable to make the infirm-
dependants credit refundable to taxpayers who support people with disabilities finan-
cially. Instead, we should channel these resources directly to people with disabilities
through the refundable DTC. With the recent addition of a supplement to the DTC for
parents of children with disabilities, making this credit refundable would also deliver
some additional assistance to these children.
A disadvantage of this model is that in simply grafting refundability onto the existing
network of provisions it would leave in place all the other gaps and problems identified
earlier in this Part. While efforts could be made at the same time to fix some of the
most serious flaws, the system would remain highly complex. Another disadvantage
is the unpredictable cost of making all existing deductions and credits refundable. To
the extent that those provisions recognize taxpayers' out-of-pocket expenses and are
not subject to any ceilings, it would be difficult to anticipate the cost to governments
of making these items fully refundable. The potential for increased cost is greatest in
the case of the METC, the deductions for businesses, and the attendant-care expense
deduction. One way to control cost would be to exclude those who are eligible for a
refund only because their income is from a non-taxable source (e.g., an employee-paid
disability insurance plan). If a person's taxable and non-taxable income together
provide a comfortable standard of living, she could reasonably be denied a refund of
excess tax credits. Some might argue that it is inequitable to exclude these individuals
from the benefits of a tax expenditure that is functionally equivalent to a direct
spending program. However, the counter-argument is that refundability should be
focused on those who are truly low income.
Once again, however, the greatest challenge in implementing this model would be to
coordinate the federal refundable credits with provincial programs. While the federal
government could legislate refundability unilaterally, the provinces would have no
obligation to contribute to the cost. More important, they could reduce social-assis-
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tance payments by the amount of any refundable credits received, thereby negating
any benefit for some of the poorest people with disabilities and possibly leaving some
much worse off due to the loss of ancillary welfare benefits. Experience with the
National Child Benefit weighs heavily against simply allowing the provinces to
reinvest the welfare savings in other disability-related programs. Whatever the value
of those programs, there is no guarantee that they would benefit the same individuals
who had their welfare payments clawed back. To avoid further disadvantaging this
extremely vulnerable group, it would be imperative to reach agreement with the
provinces not to claw back the refundable credits. To improve the lot of this group,
federal refundable credits would need to be in addition to, not instead of, provincial
social assistance.
Provincial cost sharing would also be a matter for negotiation. If a province wished
to contribute, it could do so by enacting parallel refundable credits in its own tax
legislation. Alternatively it could make a matching investment in direct transfers or
programs for the relevant target groups. However, the federal government would have
little leverage to encourage provincial participation in the scheme, and provinces
might be reluctant to invest in an initiative that is politically associated mostly with
the federal government.
Whether the program was purely federal or jointly operated with the provinces, it
would be prudent to require a series of regular, public reviews of the cost, distributive
effects, and policy effectiveness of the refundable credits. As discussed in Part IH, tax
expenditure programs tend to avoid this type of scrutiny too easily, so that controls
should be built in from the start.
3. Create a New Refundable Tax Credit for People with Disabilities
This model is the most far-reaching, for it contemplates a brand new refundable credit
that would likely replace the two primary non-refundable credits under the current
ITA--the DTC and the METC-and possibly other provisions such as the attendant-
care expense deduction and the infirm-dependants credit. It would be designed
specifically for people with disabilities and would be separate from the recognition of
medical and health expenses incurred outside the context of disability. Ideally it would
be designed to address all the fundamental criticisms of existing disability-related tax
measures, and to promote income security, access to goods and services, and the full
social and economic integration of individuals with disabilities. In order to achieve
these goals, especially the reduction of poverty, political negotiations would be needed
in order to overcome the provincial propensity to claw back refundable credits from
welfare recipients and to redirect that money to low-income wage earners. This
practice is especially problematic for people with disabilities who still face many
barriers to employment, and whose labour-force participation is far lower as a group
than that of non-disabled people. 10 4 The success of any refundable credit program
delivered federally will be contingent on finding a solution to this problem.
104. See Statistics Canada, A Portrait of People with Disabilities (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science
and Technology, 1995) at 45-59.
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One of the key policy choices in designing a new refundable credit would be the
question of universal versus targeted benefits. Both Canada's National Child Benefit
(NCB) and Britain's Disabled Person's Tax Credit (DPTC) are examples of targeted,
income-tested programs. A brief examination of these programs demonstrates why
they are not good models for achieving the broad policy objectives of refundability
for people with disabilities.
The NCB at first glance appears to offer a handy template for ajoint federal-provincial
income-support program in the area of disability. It would target benefits exclusively
to lower- and middle-income people, providing a flat-rate annual benefit calculated
in advance and paid periodically throughout the year, and phasing out above a defined
income limit. Supplementary components could be designed to support paid labour or
other forms of social participation. Despite the initial appeal of focusing all new
resources on the most needy, however, the NCB model has a host of drawbacks,
especially when translated to the disability context.
First, a flat-rate income-tested benefit is not sensitive to the widely varying costs of
disability among different individuals. Flat benefits would inevitably fall far short of
the real costs borne by some, while possibly overcompensating others. For the same
reason, it would be very difficult to set income thresholds in a way that reliably tested
need. Second, adding an income-tested credit would increase rather than decrease the
technical complexity of the tax system. This is because it could not replace the existing
DTC, the METC, or other provisions without seriously violating the principle of
horizontal equity. An income-tested measure by definition would exclude those who
by any measure are affluent, but who nonetheless incur non-discretionary costs related
to their disabilities. These costs reduce ability to pay and can be onerous, even for a
higher-income person. They would still need to be recognized elsewhere in the tax
system, most likely by retaining existing non-refundable measures alongside the new
refundable credit program. Unfortunately this would leave in place all of the defects
and inequities of existing provisions, as well as further complicating the tax treatment
of disabilities. Depending on their design, an individual might qualify for both
non-refundable and refundable credits, or might have to determine which is more
advantageous to her each year, as circumstances and costs changed. This points to a
third danger of income-tested credits: that by singling out low-income people with
disabilities for treatment different from their higher-income counterparts, they may
increase the social stigma of receiving the credit.
A fourth issue in designing an income-tested credit is whether eligibility would be
based on individual or household income. The NCB uses a spousal unit, disqualifying
claimants who are married or living common law if the total income of the partners
exceeds a certain level. The problem with this approach is its assumption that income
is always shared equally or at least sufficiently to meet the needs of the lower-income
or non-earning spouse. Many advocacy groups have stressed the importance of
promoting autonomy and independence for people with disabilities, and this must
include autonomy within their own families. If the person with a disability is the
intended beneficiary of a refundable credit, it should be delivered to her, regardless
of her spouse's income. This same concern applies to those who provide unpaid care
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for people with disabilities to the exclusion of market work. The cost of delivering
refundable credits to individuals with higher-income spouses could be financed at least
in part by denying dependency credits that would otherwise be claimed by the
breadwinner in the household, such as the spousal credit, caregiver credit, and
infirm-dependants credit.
A fifth issue to be confronted in designing an income-tested refundable credit is
whether non-taxable forms of disability income should be counted in determining
eligibility. It is likely they should be, to avoid inequities between those receiving
taxable versus non-taxable forms of income. This too would add complexity to the tax
system, because certain types of income would be counted for some purposes but not
others.
A sixth problem with the NCB model relates to the rate at which benefits are lost when
an individual's market income exceeds a certain level. As discussed earlier in this Part,
there is a concern about creating labour-market disincentives if the benefits of earning
more than the eligibility threshold for refundable credits are almost entirely lost
through the application of regular tax rates plus the clawback of the credit itself.105
This concern is greater where the individual has a disability that must be accommo-
dated at some cost in order to engage in paid work. In many cases, such a person may
need more support rather than less upon starting a job, at least in the shorter term, and
especially if she is working part time or for low wages.
Britain has attempted to promote labour-market participation by people with disabil-
ities by creating the Disabled Persons Tax Credit (DPTC), a refundable credit paid
only to those engaged in paid work for at least 16 hours per week. Originally named
the Disability Working Allowance and delivered through the social security system,
it was converted to a tax benefit in 1999.106 The DPTC is more generous than the old
Disability Working Allowance, but otherwise few changes were made, other than to
switch its administration to revenue authorities, and to require that employers deliver
the benefit as part of the employee's regular paycheque, rather than having a separate
cheque sent by government. Thus the DPTC has many features common to a welfare
benefit. Eligibility is based on certain family income and capital thresholds, and
applicants must produce documentation to support their claims. Benefits are paid in
flat increments, depending on the marital status of the claimant and the number of
children, if any, in his or her care. A supplementary amount can be paid to cover
child-care costs. As a model for what Canada might do to improve tax-based support
to low-income people with disabilities, the DPTC has many of the same limitations
as the National Child Benefit. In addition, it applies only to those who are employed
or self-employed and therefore could not be useful in reducing poverty or meeting
other needs of the relatively high proportion of people with disabilities who are not in
the paid labour force. As a mechanism for promoting labour-market integration, the
impact of the DPTC is unclear. Take-up rates under its predecessor, the old Disability
105. Supra note 94, and associated text.
106. Tax Credits Act, 1999. See CCH British Tax Reporter, paras. 211-700 - 211-755.
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Working Allowance, were reportedly very low, with a full third of claims failing
because employment failed to meet the weekly 16-hour requirement.107 While incen-
tives might theoretically attract more people into paid work, it should be noted that in
1991 almost 60% of those Canadians with disabilities aged 15-64 who did not
participate in the labour force reported they were completely prevented from doing so
by their condition.1 08 Certainly income and other supports are needed to ensure that
people with disabilities have access to workplaces as well as other public spaces and
activities. But a fuller employment strategy by itself would be grossly inadequate to
address the high rates of poverty among people with disabilities.
The limitations of targeted, income-tested credits could be avoided by instead creating
a universal credit that applies to all people with disabilities, but is refundable to those
who have insufficient tax liability to absorb it. An example of such a program is the
Disability Expenses Tax Credit proposed in 1996 by the Federal Task Force on
Disability Issues. 109 Their suggested credit would replace and improve upon the DTC
and METC by:
" relaxing eligibility criteria
" recognizing the full medical and ordinary living costs associated with disabili-
ties, assuming the most independent, integrated living situation possible for each
individual
" giving special recognition to the costs of accessing employment or self-employ-
ment
" being periodically refundable in advance
The credit would comprise at least two components: a base amount to reflect the
hidden, indirect costs of living with a disability, and a flexible amount that would
depend on itemized expenditures for equipment, products, or services. Costs of
accessing employment or self-employment could be included in the second component
or be given preferential treatment in a third component. The Federal Task Force
suggested that the base amount could be less than the current DTC, provided that the
cost component is more reflective of actual costs than the existing METC. However,
it should be noted this would likely disadvantage lower-income people, who can afford
to purchase fewer goods and services than those with higher incomes. These individ-
uals would benefit more from a higher base amount. The value to lower-income people
could also be enhanced by making the credit rate higher than the 16% now used for
most personal credits. For example, the Federal Task Force proposed that the credit
be delivered at the rate of 29% for low-income persons and 17% (then the lowest
marginal tax rate) for all others, again to target more resources to those with least
income.
107. J. Cooper & Stuart Vernon, Disability and the Law (London and Bristol, Penn.: Jessica Kingsley
Publishers Ltd., 1996) at 172.
108. Statistics Canada, supra note 104 at 48.
109. Supra note 5.
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Covering all people with disabilities under a single universal tax credit would mini-
mize its chances of being stigmatized as a welfare program. It also has the prospect
of simplifying and rationalizing the current system and addressing many of the gaps
and problems identified earlier in this Part. If designed broadly enough, it could also
replace the attendant-care expense deduction, rationalizing the system even further.
The costs of disability would be recognized in their own right, separate from medical
expenses that are incurred outside the context of disability, hopefully contributing to
a less medicalized understanding of disability within and beyond income-tax law. The
integration components of such a credit could be broadened beyond paid work to
address the costs of social and economic participation more generally, including full
participation in the private sphere of home and family. Thus, it could potentially
achieve substantial gains in all three areas of need: income support, access to goods
and services, and integration. Other measures would be needed, however, to address
accommodation and other costs for businesses, and the unpaid work of caregivers.
If any new refundable credit is indeed created to replace the DTC and METC, it would
be critical to address the concerns discussed earlier in this paper, about the relative
non-transparency of tax-expenditure programs, and the need for coordination with the
provinces to ensure that social-assistance recipients are not left out of the initiative.
In addition, designers would have to develop a plan for administering the new
provisions. Such a reform would involve substantial changes to the current system,
with a need for clear and consistent information and application to individual taxpay-
ers, as well as significant education campaigns. To the extent that such a credit replaced
two or more existing credits, the stakes would be higher for an individual in gaining
or being denied access to the new credit. 110 One of the chief drawbacks of delivering
such a program through the tax system is that administrative expertise is more
generalized and focused on tax collection, rather than the specific objectives of
disability support. As well, concerns have been raised repeatedly about the inaccessi-
bility of the tax appeal process to people with disabilities. Some advocacy groups have
called for an administrative tribunal process for handling disputes over disability tax
benefits more quickly and cheaply. Whatever structure is employed to administer a
new disability credit, its personnel should include people with disabilities, people
knowledgeable about disabilities, and people knowledgeable about the policy objec-
tives and technical design of the new program.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated that despite a complicated network of disability-related
provisions and the persistent reform efforts of community advocates and policy
makers in recent years, the income tax system still fails people who experience both
disability and low income. It argues that refundable credits are a compelling policy
option for correcting this problem, but also highlights the very real drawbacks of
tax-based programming and suggests how a refundable credit could be designed to
110. Caledon Institute, The Disability Income System in Canada: Options for Reform (Ottawa: Caledon
Institute for Social Policy, 1996) at 1.
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mitigate problems of technical complexity, non-transparency, and lack of administra-
tive expertise. Even the best-designed refundable credit could not perform some of
the essential functions of direct-spending programs, particularly social assistance. Nor
could it substitute for the regulatory efforts and direct investments in disability-related
goods and services that are also needed to ensure full citizenship status for people with
disabilities. While transfers to individuals should play a more positive role than they
do now, more centralized action by governments is also required to improve the
well-being and advance the equality interests of people with disabilities.
Finally, policy makers need to ensure that people with disabilities are included at all
stages in developing, designing, drafting, and implementing reforms to the income-tax
system. The traditionally closed process of tax-law making must give way if the tax
system is to be used effectively to achieve the objectives important to this community.
In seeking expert input from people with disabilities, policy makers must also be aware
of the community's diversity and the need to avoid subtle race, class, and gender biases
in imagining what kinds of support are needed and by whom.
